El burócrata elusor del deber :
¿una teoría sin sustento empírico?
Resumen
El artículo aborda la cuestión de la motivación hacia el trabajo dentro del sector público y, en particular, la noción del incumplimiento del deber por parte de los burócratas (bureaucratic shirking). Si bien numerosos partidarios de la teoría de la elección pública en la administración del Estado respaldan el modelo teórico del incumplimiento o elusión del deber, este no cuenta aún con sustento empírico. El artículo compara dos modelos organizacionales para garantizar el cumplimiento del trabajo de los empleados públicos: por un lado, un régimen contractual comúnmente usado en los países angloamericanos con base en el interés público; y, por el otro, un régimen con base en la confianza, empleado en los sistemas administrativos de la Europa continental, Escandinavia y Asia.
Abstract
The paper addresses the issue of public sector work motivation, particularly the notion of bureaucratic ‘shirking’. Although a popular theoretical model among public choice scholars of public administration, the ‘shirking’ argument has not been empirically supported. The paper compares two organizational models of ensuring public servants’ compliance; a contract regime which is common in public-interestbased, Anglo American countries, and a trust-based regime found in Continental European, Scandinavian and Asian administrative systems.
Descargas
Citas
Ahlbäck Öberg, S. (2014). «Att kontrollera förvaltningen: Framväxten av granskningssamhället». En Rothstein, B. (ed.). Politik som organisation: Förvaltningspolitikens grundproblem. Lund: Studentlitteratur, pp. 159-184.
Ansell, C. y A. Gash (2007). «Collaborative Governance in Theory and Practice». En Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory, 8, pp. 543-571.
Bellé, N. (2015). «Performance-Related Pay and the Crowding Out of Motivation in the Public Sector: A Randomized Field Experiment». En Public Administration Review, (75), 2 marzo-abril, pp. 230-241.
Blais, A. y S. Dion (1990). «Are Bureaucrats Budget Maximizers? The Niskanen Model & Its Critics». En Polity, (22), 4, verano, pp. 655-674.
Bouckaert, G. (2012). «Trust and public administration». En Administration, 60, pp. 91-115.
Bouckaert, G. y J. Halligan (2008). Managing Performance: International Comparisons. Londres: Routledge.
Brans, M. y B. G. Peters (2012). Rewards for High Public Office in Europe and North America. Londres: Routledge.
Brehm, J. O. y S. Gates (1997). Working, Shirking and Sabotage: Bureaucratic Response to a democratic Public. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
Buelens, M. y H. Van den Broeck (2007). «An analysis of differences in work motivation between public and private sector organizations». En Public Administration Review, (67), (1), pp. 65-74.
Crewson, P. E. (1997). «Public Service Motivation: Building Empirical Evidence of Incidence and Effect». En Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory, (4), 7, pp. 499-518.
Crozier, M. (1964). The Bureaucratic Phenomenon. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Donahue, J. D. y R. J. Zeckhauser (2011). Collaborative Governance: Private Roles for Public Goals in Turbulent Times. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Downs, A. (1967). Inside bureaucracy. Boston: Little, Brown and Company.
Dunleavy, P. (1991). Democracy, Bureaucracy and Public Choice. Londres: Pearson Education.
Dunleavy, P. (1985). «Bureaucrats, budgets and the growth of the state: reconstructing an instrumental model». En British Journal of Political Science, (15), 3, pp. 299-328.
Dworkin, R. (1977). Taking Rights Seriously. Harvard University Press.
Dyson, K. H. F. (1980). The State Tradition in Western Europe: A Study of an Idea and Institution. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Eichbaum, C. y R. Shaw (2010). Partisan Appointees and Public Servants: An International Analysis of the Role of the Political Adviser. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar.
Finer, H. (1941). «Administrative Responsibility in Democratic Government». En Public Administration Review, 1, pp. 335-350.
Friedrich, C. J. (1940). «Public Policy and the Nature of Administrative Responsibility». En Friedrich, C. J. y E. S. Mason (eds.). Public Policy. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, pp. 3-24.
Gailmard, S. y J. W. Patty (2007). «Slackers and Zealots: Civil Service, Policy Discretion, and Bureaucratic Expertise». En American Journal of Political Science, (51), 4, octubre, pp. 873-889.
Golden, M. (2000). Political Patronage, Bureaucracy and Corruption in Postwar Italy. Mimeo.
Hartley, J.; J. Alford; O. Hughes y S. Yates (2015). «Public value and political astuteness in the work of public managers: The art of the possible». En Public Administration, (93), 1, pp. 195-211.
Héritier, A. y D. Lehmkul (2008). «Introduction: The Shadow of Hierarchy and New Modes of Governance». En Journal of Public Policy, (28), 1, junio-abril, pp. 1-17.
Hood, C. y M. Lodge (2006). Politics of the Public Service Bargain. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Houston, D. J. (2000). «Public Service Motivation: A Multivariate Test». En Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory, (4), 10, pp. 713-727.
Huber, J. D. and C. R. Shipan (2002). Deliberate discretion: The institutional foundations of bureaucratic autonomy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Hupe, P.; M. Hill y A. Buffat (eds.) (2015). Understanding Street-Level Bureaucracy. Bristol: Policy Press.
Hupe, P. (2013). «Dimensions of Discretion: Specifying the Object of Street-Level Bureaucracy Research». En dms – der moderne staat – Zeitschrift für Public Policy, Recht und Management 6. Jg., Heft 2, pp. 425-440.
John, P. y M. Johnson (2008). «Is there still a public service ethos?». En Park, A.; J. Curtice; K. Thomson; M. Phillips; M. Johnson y E. Clery (eds.). British Social Attitudes: The 24th Report. Londres: Sage, pp. 105-127.
Lipsky, M. (1980). Street-Level Bureaucracy: Dilemmas of the Individual in Public Services. Nueva York: Russell Sage Foundation.
Meier, K. J. y L. J. O’Toole (2006). Bureaucracy in a democratic state: A governance perspective. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.
Meyers, M. K. y S. Vorsanger (2003). «Street-Level Bureaucrats and the Implementation of Public Policy». En Peters, B. G. y J. Pierre (eds.). Handbook of Public Administration. Londres: Sage, pp. 153-163.
Niskanen, W. A. (1971). Bureaucracy and Representative Government. Chicago: Aldine, Atherton.
Page, E. C. (2012). Policy without politicians: Bureaucratic influence in comparative perspective. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Painter, M. y B. G. Peters (eds.) (2010). Tradition and Public Administration. Basingstoke: Palgrave.
Peacock, A. (1983). «Public X-Inefficiency: Informational and Institutional Constraints». En Hanusch, H. (ed.). Anatomy of Government Deficiencies. Berlín: Springer-Verlag, pp. 125-138.
Perry, J. L. (2000). «Bringing society in: Towards a theory of public-service motivation». En Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory, (2), 10, pp. 471-488.
Perry, J. L. (1996). «Measuring Public Service Motivation: An Assessment of Construct Reliability and Validity». En Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory, 6, (1), pp. 5-22.
Perry, J. L. y L. Wise (1990). «The Motivational Bases of Public Service». En Public Administration Review, (3), 50, pp. 367-373.
Peters, B. G. (2001). The Future of Governing. Lawrence, KS: University of Kansas Press.
Pierre, J. (2013). Globalization and Governance. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar.
Pierre, J. (2011). «Stealth Economy?: Economic Theory and the Politics of Administrative Reform». En Administration and Society, 43, pp. 672-692.
Pollitt, Ch. y G. Bouckaert (2011). Public Management Reform: A Comparative Analysis – New Public Management, Governance, and the Neo–Weberian State. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Prendergast, C. (2007). «The Motivation and Bias of Bureaucrats». En American Economic Review, (97), 1, pp. 180-196.
Rainey, H. G. (1997). Understanding & managing public organisations. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass.
Rose-Ackerman, S. (1986). «Reforming Public Bureaucracy through Economic Incentives?». En Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, (2), Issue 1, pp. 131-61.
Simon, H. A. (1997). Administrative Behavior: A Study of Decision Making Processes in Administrative Organizations. Nueva York: The Free Press.
Ting, M. (2013). «A Strategic Theory of Bureaucratic Redundancy». En American Journal of Political Science, (47), Issue 2, abril, pp. 274–292.
Vandenabeele, W.; G. A. Brewer y A. Ritz (2014). «Past, present and future of public service motivation research». En Public Administration, (92), Issue 4, pp. 779-789.
Waterman, R. W. y K. J. Meijer (2004). «Principal-agent models: A theoretical Culde-Sac». En Waterman, R.; A. A. Rouse; R. Wright (eds.). Bureaucrats, Politics, and the Environment. Estados Unidos: University of Pittburgh Press.
Wilson, J. (1989). Bureaucracy: What Government Agencies Do and Why They Do It. Estados Unidos: Basic Books.
Bibliografía de consulta
Edelenbos, J. y J. Esthuis (2011). «The Interplay Between Trust and Control in Governance Processes: A Conceptual and Empirical Investigation». En Administration and Society, 44, pp. 647-674.
Montin, S. (2015). «Från tilltrobaserad till misstrobaserad styrning: relationen mellan stat och kommun och styrning av äldreomsorg». En Nordisk Administrativt Tidsskrift, 92, pp. 58-75.
Mueller, D. (1979). Public Choice. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
La Revista Estado Abierto y su contenido se brindan bajo una Licencia Creative Commons Atribución-No Comercial 2.5 Argentina.Es posible copiar, comunicar y distribuir públicamente su contenido siempre que se cite a los autores individuales y el nombre de esta publicación, así como la institución editorial. El contenido de la Revista Estado Abierto no puede utilizarse con fines comerciales.
